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from the Withering Away of 
Labour to the Concrete 
Universality of Work.  
 
Fabio Vighi 
 
This article engages with Todd McGowan’s Emancipation after Hegel by 
taking seriously its overall ambition, that of thinking emancipation in conjunction with 
the central Hegelian category of the contradiction. Endorsing the intractability of the 
contradiction, that is to say the self-relating inadequacy (negativity, inconsistency) of 
thought, is for McGowan the philosophical task par excellence for any reader of 
Hegel. In what follows, I tackle the above proposition by exploring it in connection 
with the capital-labour dialectic. The aim, however, is not to offer yet another debate 
on Marx’s controversial return to Hegel. Rather, I probe the extent to which Hegel’s 
dialectical method of enquiry allows us to grasp the immanent contradiction of 
contemporary capitalism and its socio-economic crisis. I argue that while capital is 
by definition reconciled with its labour contradiction, insofar as the latter is the engine 
of its mode of production and socio-economic dynamism, at the same time such 
dialectic is now fast approaching its expiration date: the historical tipping point at 
which the contradiction stops working for capital and mercilessly begins to destroy 
its foundations. 
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Our time is dominated by the perception that we are descending, as if in slow 
motion, into a nightmarishly incoherent realm where life is no longer supported by 
the presupposition of shared symbolic values, and the future ceaselessly relapses 
into a claustrophobic present. Yet we continue to disavow such an insight, choosing 
instead to believe in our global economic narrative and its increasingly sour fruits, 
despite the fact that even such metafiction is now evaporating before our eyes. While 
our shared history is growing increasingly fragile and untenable, we are unable to let 
go of its framing assumptions. Our anxiety would seem to arise from our inability to 
articulate the terms and stakes of the explosive contradictions that mark our epoch. 
Confronted by this impasse, perhaps the first Hegelian step to take, if we are to turn 
anxiety into enthusiasm, is to abandon all hope, and throw ourselves rationally into 
the emptiness of our condition. In Emil Cioran’s words, we need to rein in our 
palpitations and cool down our ardours, in the awareness that all this continues only 
“because our desires beget that decorative universe which a jot of lucidity would lay 
bare.”1 
Lucidity, however, requires dialectical thinking. A Hegelian approach to 
contemporary crisis suggests that we need to grasp our world not as an excitingly 
diverse conglomeration of lifestyles and cultures, but as a totality of social relations 
coincidental with the wearied yet stubborn self-movement of capital, the blob-like 
global expansion of abstract wealth now reaching its point of deflation.2 It is the 
enduring authority of abstract wealth that continues to lend a degree of imaginary 
consistency to our world, the tacit coalition of an increasingly sterile life around a 
“mass of desires and convictions superimposed on reality like a morbid structure”.3 
The Hegelian moment, then, is neither a time for hope nor one for wisdom. Let us say 
it by borrowing, again, the refreshingly pessimistic words of Cioran “Wisdom is the 
last word of an expiring civilization, the nimbus of historic twilights, fatigue 
transfigured into a vision of the world, the last tolerance before the advent of other, 
newer gods – and of barbarism; wisdom, what we call sagesse, is also a vain 
attempt at melody among the environing death rattles.”4 
What our time calls for, rather, is a robust sense of fatalism,5 which might help 
us to relinquish the blinding injunctions that condemn our winded civilisation to its 
credulity. Increasingly devoid of lifeblood, our work society overflows with the 
melancholic hyperactivity and fretful enervation of Shakespearian heroes, unwittingly 
heading for collapse. The modern idol of economic value – the metafiction in which 
all other values are rooted – lies unmasked in front of us, and yet we persist in 
enslaving our consciousness to its grand narrative, because by renouncing value we 
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would renounce ourselves. Our caged restlessness is symptomatic of the strength 
we lack when facing the prejudice that binds us to our historical destiny. Fanatics 
without conviction, we are lured on by the wreckage of a glimmering world, and we 
crawl before the altar of capital half-knowing that it exists only for our dispassionate 
gaze. And yet… and yet it is becoming clear to most of us that “[w]e shall not be able 
to sustain the ceremony of our contradictions much longer.”6 
 
Somewhere Hegel is Smiling... 
After the ideological binge of postmodern relativism – which truly was (is) the 
cultural logic of late capitalism –7 we must begin again from Marx’s scrutiny of the 
capitalist mode of production, which is both a dialectical relation between capital 
and wage labour, and a social form and mode of symbolic reproduction. This is 
because – let us state it from the start – the history of modernity as such is the history 
of the dialectical liaison between capital and labour. We should therefore let go of 
our liberal obsession with individual identities and instead focus on our common 
social substance, insofar as it continues to be delivered to the dull pressure of an 
increasingly impotent drive for profit-making. If history proved Marx wrong on many 
counts, his compulsive urge to dissect the “real abstraction”8 of capitalist relations, 
which began to haunt him in the 1850s, remains the decisive orientation for any 
philosophical and political enquiry that wishes to focus on the terminal malady of 
contemporary society. But to carry out this task effectively we need to delve into the 
presuppositions of Marx’s critique of political economy, namely Hegel’s dialectical 
system. Although Hegel and Marx are customarily accused of the same cardinal sin 
– a teleological and universalistic rendition of the dialectic – a closer look reveals a 
different, highly nuanced picture. 
Marx inherited from Hegel the persuasion that human beings are responsible 
for creating organic systems of dialectical correlations whose magnitude proves to 
be greater and more formidable than any of their individual components. In 
capitalism, the systemic whole is grounded in the abstraction that Marx called 
Wertform (value-form), constituted by the performative interrelation of the 
commodity-, money- and capital-forms of value, logical moments of a tirelessly 
repetitive process. These moments presuppose and feed into each other in a circular 
and synchronous rather than temporal progression (once capital is in motion, its 
stages and temporalities merge into one).9 In its relentless hyperactivity, capital 
dialectically informs and presupposes its subjectivities, making us all equal 
(ironically!) in our frenzied devotion to its rituals. For this reason alone, we should 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Emancipation after Hegel 
 
 
 
 
86 
reclaim the Hegelian impulse that drove Marx to dissect the social discourse of his 
time. For Hegel’s ambition to capture the universal forms of historical constellations 
is what qualifies most enduringly Marx’s critique of political economy, and should 
also motivate our search for truth in the face of the continuing valorisation crisis (and 
attendant decomposition of social relations) in the 21st century. 
The only correct way of understanding the relevance of Marx’s critique of 
political economy for today’s world is therefore the Hegelian one: we must abandon 
the narrow perspective of the particular capital, the particular enterprise, and the 
particular worker, in order to apprehend capital as the ubiquitous ether in which we 
are all immersed, a seemingly inescapable socio-historical formation supported by a 
dialectical logic whose truth becomes available to us both as substance (the 
underpinning objectivity of political economy) and as subject (our social participation 
in that objectivity). By following the Hegelian lesson inherited and at least partially 
endorsed by Marx, we are able to appreciate how, in capitalism, subject and 
substance are two sides of the same coin – if you take one away, you immediately 
lose the other. This in turn exposes a subtle form of disavowal: whenever we claim 
autonomy and independence of thought through adherence to spiritual, political or 
ideological values – as bourgeois societies have always tended to do – we 
conveniently forget that modern subjectivity is fundamentally sequestrated by the 
capitalist dialectic of valorisation; the more the latter’s role is denied, the more 
emphatically it imposes its domination upon us. Since its inception, bourgeois 
thought enforced political economy as its ontological horizon by naturalizing its 
foundational categories as constitutive of the human being’s destiny. This process of 
embedding is clearly discernible in Adam Smith’s eternalization of production and 
exchange as matters of immediate sensible experience and undisputable 
knowledge, while it is also announced in John Locke’s dehistoricisation of private 
property and David Hume’s utilitarian desocialisation of human nature. The 
progressive extension of capitalist valorization over other modes of production meant 
that the reproduction of social life become increasingly dependent on the economy. 
While deeply aware of the Great Transformation introduced by political economy,10 
Hegel’s dialectical method of philosophical enquiry (which was the mature Marx’s 
main source of inspiration) was fundamentally opposed to a view of the world where 
external reality is reduced to measurable quantities. 
There is little doubt that, at least since the Grundrisse (1857-58), Hegel’s 
influence on Marx proved decisive.11 After his ambivalent “settling of accounts” with 
his illustrious predecessor in the last chapter of the 1844 Manuscripts (aptly entitled 
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“Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole”),12 Marx continued to 
gravitate toward Hegel as he turned again to him (specifically, this time, the Science 
of Logic) in his quest to unveil the inner nature of the capitalist system, where self-
valorising value (captured by Marx in the general formula M-C-M’) emerges as 
money’s attempt to overcome its historical impasse as simple mediator of 
commodities (C-M-C). Marx’s narration is well known: to actualise itself as capital, 
value in money-form (wealth accumulated in pre-capitalist times) began treating 
work as a special commodity for market exchange; once bought, sold and put to 
work, the labour-commodity started laying golden eggs, generating surplus-value as 
the trigger of the system’s self-reproduction. With this historical and systemic 
transition, money upgraded its status from means of circulation (C-M-C) to end of 
exchange (M-C-M’), thereby restyling itself as capital. Marx described the difference 
between the two types of money-form through Aristotle’s distinction between 
economics (whose purpose is the creation of use-values) and chrematistics (whose 
purpose is the limitless expansion of wealth).13 
The interesting point to note here, however, is less the issue of the historical 
genesis of capitalism per se than the dialectical constitution of the new socio-
economic relation around the two poles of money and labour, which mediate each 
other to form capital as a dynamic totality. However, against the mythicization of the 
proletariat implemented by the orthodox Marxist tradition, the Hegelian reading 
should be privileged here: proletariat and bourgeoisie are not in conflict as 
autonomous subjects/classes, but are from the start united in a passionate 
dialectical embrace. The central aspect of this systemic relation is what Marx, in the 
chapter on “Simple Reproduction” at the end of Capital volume 1, alluded to as a shift 
affecting labour: “A division between the product of labour and labour itself, between 
the objective conditions of labour and subjective labour-power, was therefore the 
real foundation and the starting-point of the process of capitalist production.”14 More 
to the point, the transition to capitalism was enabled by the structural shift through 
which work was no longer treated as a relatively obscure, untapped subjective 
capacity to produce things that the wealthy owner of the means of production would 
then enjoy or exchange on the market. Instead, it acquired centre-stage in the social 
discourse of modernity by morphing into the scientifically quantifiable object (labour) 
through which value could expand itself. Thus, labour-power was granted the 
prestigious rank of “possessor of the value-creating substance”,15 but only in as much 
as the workers’ employment in the production process was constitutively regimented 
within a new abstract logic based on the monetary retribution of labour-time, which 
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of course included the vampiric extortion of surplus labour-time. For the capitalist 
mode of production to attain ontological cogency and resilience, then, a new 
narrative concerning the computability of labour had to be invented and installed 
within the social fabric. By the time the worker turned – to use Marx’s accurate 
expression – into “time’s carcass”,16 a new social form based on the valorisation of 
labour qua pure ‘motion in time’ had already imposed itself. Labour as spatio-
temporal representation – no doubt a filiation of the coeval discourse of scientific 
objectivity – was thus the invention through which capitalism began it course. 
The central hypothesis advanced here is that the elementary function of the 
abstracting relation between capital and labour – a dialectic of forms if ever there 
was one – is to conceal the self-contradictory status of economic value in modern 
societies, a value that bestows on these societies the necessary semblance of 
substantiality. Since we started living under the shadow of the capital-labour relation, 
that shadow has provided us with ontological cover, a common point of 
identification. A Hegelian approach to the critique of value, then, should 
conceptualise the value-form as a totalising social fiction that works by mediating 
itself through labour as its posited presupposition. Put differently, capitalist 
autopoiesis (self-creation) needed to assert labour-power as its own cause. This 
means that Hegel’s Setzung der Voraussetzungen (positing the presuppositions) 
remains the crucial dialectical figure insofar as it reveals how the capitalist discourse 
began to thrive by establishing labour as its socially antagonistic value, whose role in 
the modern ‘theatre of illusions’ is precisely to be scientifically valorised and 
exploited. The implication here is that wage workers were from the start conceived 
as machines by capital. This would immediately disqualify the assumption, voiced 
with force by Italian operaismo (workerism), that within contemporary capitalist 
relations there exists a communal collective capacity for radical political 
emancipation. As pointed out by Riccardo Bellofiore, “[l]abour not only counts as 
abstract in commodity circulation, when it is already objectified, but it is already 
abstract in production, as living labour.”17 Exchange values, in other words, are 
embedded within the principle of universal exchangeability, which is ultimately what 
qualifies production and constitutes ‘value’. Through an act of self-externalisation, 
then, or self-othering, capital gave birth to itself by fashioning a dialectical correlation 
with its labour presupposition, thus instituting the socio-ontological boundary within 
which its mode of production proliferated. This boundary was installed by a narrative 
concerning the computation of work. 
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The above act of self-mediation is ungrounded and sovereign, inasmuch as it 
implies the reciprocal “transubstantiation” of capital and labour as two speculatively 
identical moments of the same value-creating process. This suggests that if “[l]abour 
becomes productive only by producing its own opposite”,18 by the same token capital 
exists only by transubstantiating into labour as its dialectical other.19 It is not simply 
that labour produces value, and this value is then expropriated by the capitalist – this 
is the ultimately non-dialectical ‘exploitation narrative’ advanced by most 20th century 
labour movements. While Marx repeatedly asserted that labour is indeed the 
substance of value, he also qualified it as a dialectical category incessantly 
(re)produced by capital. Marx’s ambiguity on this crucial speculative matter should 
not be shirked but assumed as the symptom of his greatness.  
 
Painting it Grey: a Shape of Life Grown Old 
The precondition for my approach to value-critique is the awareness that every 
socio-ontological formation is constituted by logical abstractions engaged in 
dialectical struggle not merely among themselves, but more fundamentally with the 
self-relating negativity that, according to Hegel, is constitutive of Being in its 
concreteness. With the installation of the capitalist mode of production as the 
ontological horizon of modernity, labour-power emerged as the new site of a conflict 
where the socially synthetic narrative was played out. In Hegelian parlance, I take 
labour-power to be an abstraction of work as a concrete universal (a recalcitrant, 
self-relating contradiction), to which capital accords determinacy via its ‘employment’ 
by the means of production.20 It should be noted that this understanding of work has 
nothing to do with Marx’s notion of concrete labour as producer of use-values,21 as I 
see the latter to make sense only within the universality of labour as capitalist 
abstraction.22 A Hegelian approach to work, on the other hand, cannot but privilege 
the negative relation between subject and matter, insofar as this relation shapes the 
object as much as the subject, thus uniting them in their intrinsic self-difference. As a 
determinate negation of matter, work is creative for Hegel not because it produces 
abstractly comparable values, but because it expresses a singular concreteness 
which, in its self-relating recalcitrance, is permanent and universal. This is why the 
truth of work, for Hegel as well as for Lacan, is on the side of the slave (bondsman): 
in his/her work qua negation of infinite, meaningless materiality, the slave achieves 
negative unity (concrete universality) with the object. This is precisely what Hegel 
has in mind when he defines the slave’s work, in a well-known passage of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, as “desire held in check, fleetingness staved off”, 
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immediately adding that the “negative relation to the object becomes its form and 
something permanent, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has 
independence.” In its deepest, universal configuration, work is creative by engaging 
and tarrying with the negative, not by overcoming negativity in the positive 
exchangeability of the object: “This negative middle term or the formative activity is at 
the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now, in 
the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence.”23 
In the third part of the Logic, more precisely in the chapter called “Teleology”, 
Hegel emphasises how a concrete universal, differently from an abstract universal 
“that only subsumes”, owes its status to its particular self-externality, that is to say to 
its “impulse to repel itself from itself”.24 This impulse – which is formally comparable 
with the Freudian drive – is precisely what abstract universals are blind to, insofar as 
they exclude/negate certain concrete determinations without realising the self-
reflexiveness of such an act of negation: the latter does not merely refer to the 
negated determinations, but it bends back into its self qua universal, thus making 
universality concrete.25 This theme is indeed central to Hegel’s entire “subjective logic” 
(volume 2 of his Science of Logic), in which the concept is construed as a universal 
whose totality is both “absolute determinateness” and a “negation of 
determinateness”, “the diremption of its self”.26 When Hegel discusses concrete 
universality in relation to the dialectical couple genus-species, for instance, he 
characterises genus as a universal form that, while extending over its particular 
species, at the same time is itself one of its own species. As such, it is a “negative 
self-identity”27 that cannot precede and subsume its determinations, but rather 
emerges through its correlation with one of them: a genus encounters itself in one of 
its species as its determination, which also means that its framing capacity is not 
external, but it arises from within, in its connection with a particular species. A whole 
(for instance, the generic concept of production) exists only in relation to one of its 
determinations (for instance, the capitalist mode of production) which through that 
correlation over-determines all others.28 
This speculative point tells us that what is concretely universal is not the 
diversity of various species belonging to a common genus, but the self-difference or 
exceptionality of each species as it coincides with the radical inconsistency of the 
genus. While “[s]pecies are contrary inasmuch as they are merely diverse”, and 
“[t]hey are contradictory, inasmuch as they exclude one another”, nevertheless “each 
of these determinations is by itself one-sided and void of truth”. Instead, concrete 
universality captures the speculative coincidence of the self-disjunctive singularity of 
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each species and their negative unity in their genus: “In the ‘either or’ of the 
disjunctive judgment, their unity is posited as their truth, which is that the 
independent subsistence of the species as concrete universality is itself also the 
principle of the negative unity by which they mutually exclude one another.”29 The 
exclusionary logic of diverse identities, then, is concretely universal only inasmuch as 
it reflects their self-relating negativity, since the latter captures the universal principle 
of their negative unity, thus undermining any (intrinsically identitarian) notion of 
abstract universality.  
Slavoj Žižek provided a clear account of the disruptive potential of concrete 
universality: 
 
Abstract universality is the mute medium of all particular content, concrete 
universality unsettles the identity of the particular from within; it is a line of 
division which is itself universal, running across the entire sphere of the 
particular, dividing it from itself. Abstract universality is uniting; concrete 
universality is dividing. Abstract universality is the peaceful foundation of 
particulars; concrete universality is the site of struggle – it brings the sword, 
not love.30 
 
In short, a concrete universal can only emerge and manifest itself as the 
partiality of an engaged stance: it is concrete insofar as it shows purpose, and it is 
universal because it embodies an incompleteness or impossibility that is common to 
all subjective positions. Thus, every concrete universal expresses itself as a form of 
self-relating inadequacy: it is frustratingly unable to realise itself in a particular 
identity; it is the self-difference, or rupture, that belies the false universality of any 
abstract category. To paraphrase Hegel’s wonderful definition from the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, the difference between concrete and abstract universality 
is the defect of both.31 This is because concrete universality, as self-relating negativity, 
unmasks the defectiveness (radical incompleteness) of the abstract universality to 
which it refers. In today’s geopolitical constellation, for instance, concrete universality 
is represented by all those subjectivities who do not enjoy a stable position within the 
social order, and therefore experience themselves as dislocated, excluded, scarred, 
prevented from achieving their particular identity. Here it is crucial to insist that this 
inherent tension and insufficiency of a particular identity is, literally, universal: it 
defines the global social order itself as inconsistent and lacking, therefore vulnerable 
and open to its reconfiguration.  
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The above Hegelian topic can be translated into psychoanalytic terms through 
Jacques Lacan’s dialectical categories – for instance, that of sexual difference. The 
latter is concretely universal because it signals how the impossibility inherent in each 
sexual identity overlaps with the universal inconsistency of sexuality as such. In 
Lacan, the very difference between Symbolic and Real can be seen to reflect the 
antagonism between abstract and concrete universality: the concreteness of the 
Real, its singular unruliness, coincides with the universal inconsistency of the 
Symbolic. In that respect, labour as working capacity should be enlisted within the 
register of the Real of jouissance – always the intractable work of the unconscious, 
which as such relates to a specific modality of enjoyment – while the valorisation 
process is the (by definition failed) attempt to convert this unconscious, concrete 
‘laboring’ into a socio-symbolic fiction whose legitimacy claim rests on the 
ideological imposition, and policing, of the abstract exchangeability of the labour-
commodity. Lacan’s definition of the unconscious substance of work in non-
productivist terms is crucial for my Hegelian argument concerning the implosion of 
the capitalist dialectic with its foundation in labour-power. Lacan’s linking of work to 
knowledge and thus to the Real of jouissance (work as savoir-faire, unconscious 
knowledge-at-work), in Seminars XVI and XVII, 32 grants his theoretical position a 
dialectical advantage over other critiques of labour and capitalist productivity that 
emerged in France in the early 1970s, such as those of Jean Baudrillard, Georges 
Bataille and Jacques Camatte.33  
One way of capturing Lacan’s notion of work as a negative substance 
informed by unconscious knowledge, thus by definition not amenable to 
computation and valorisation, is by thinking of it in conjunction with Hegel’s 
dialectical articulation of crime as inherent to the law.34 For Hegel, crime is not merely 
antagonistic to the law, but dialectically correlated with it, as – in another instance of 
infinite judgment or speculative coincidence of opposites – it constitutes the law’s 
foundation (in order to originally assert itself, the law is, like crime, a negative force). 
More precisely, crime for Hegel is the self-relating negation that the law has as its 
foundation while attempting to conceal or counteract it by asserting itself as a 
positive and balanced set of norms. Thus, the Real intractability (negativity) of crime 
enjoys priority over the symbolic law, which is, strictly speaking, a secondary event 
that, as such, remains wholly within the horizon of crime. The dialectical couple 
crime-law is therefore formally identical to the couple work-labour: work is ‘criminal’ 
(transgressive, recalcitrant, indomitable) inasmuch as it is rooted in the antagonistic 
surplus of the unconscious, or in what Lacan names the Real of jouissance.  
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This is nowhere more evident than in crime films that focus on the savoir-faire 
of their unlawful protagonists. Perhaps the best example of this logic is Michael 
Mann’s masterpiece Thief (1981), the story of a safecracker and jewel thief named 
Frank (James Caan) whose exceptional criminal dexterity (his savoir-faire) is 
antagonised not only by the law, as we would expect, but also and more significantly 
by ring leader Leo (Robert Prosky), who helps Frank as he wants to capitalise on his 
thieving ability – that is to say, he wants Frank to work for him, thus turning his 
singular skill into profitable labour. The film’s main battleground, then, shifts from 
‘Frank vs the law’ to ‘Frank vs Leo’, where we witness the (implicitly capitalistic) 
struggle to turn the unruly core of savoir-faire into economic value, an object of 
calculation and profitability. This is brilliantly conveyed by Leo’s brutal rant toward the 
end of the film, after his henchmen beat up Frank to coerce him into obedience:  
 
You treat what I try to do for you like shit? You don’t wanna work for me, 
what’s wrong with you? And then, you carry a piece, in my house! You one 
of those burned-out demolished wackos in the joint? You’re scary, because 
you don’t give a fuck. […] You got a home, car, businesses, family, n’ I own 
the paper on ya whole fuckin’ life. I'll put ya cunt wife on the street to be 
fucked in the ass by niggers and Puerto Ricans. Ya kid’s mine because I 
bought it. You got ’im on loan, he is leased, you are renting him. I'll whack 
out ya whole family. People’ll be eatin’ ’em in their lunch tomorrow in their 
Wimpyburgers and not know it. You get paid what I say. You do what I say, I 
run you, there is no discussion. I want you work, until you are burned-out, 
you are busted, or you’re dead... you get it? You got responsibilities – tighten 
up n’ do it. […] Back to work, Frank. 
 
Capitalist universality means that labour counts because it is counted: the 
condition for its exploitation and profitability is its abstract quantification into discrete 
units of labour-time. Modern political economy constitutes itself by regulating the 
exceptionality of labour as a concrete universal. In this respect, capital is a dialectic 
of forms which parallels Hegel’s dialectic of forms of thought. This, however, does not 
mean that Marx was right in considering Hegel a philosopher of bourgeois 
modernity;35 rather, it means that by mobilising Hegel’s dialectic we have a chance to 
accomplish what Marx eventually missed: the comprehension of the structural logic 
governing the self-reproduction of the modern forms of value (commodity, money 
and capital) inclusive of their negative, concretely universal core. My Hegelian 
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reading of labour-power (together with its labour-movement iterations) as a moment 
of capital, emphasises the failure of capital’s tautological mechanism of self-
expansion. The contradictory status of labour is precisely what capitalism ‘employs’, 
in a risky operation which, today, decrees the implosion of its mode of production. 
Let us not forget that, for Hegel, philosophy “paints its grey in grey”. When 
Hegel states that “[t]he owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the falling of dusk”, 
he asserts that philosophy’s fundamental task is to reveal “a shape of life grown old”, 
the approaching end of a given form of life.36 Hegel’s philosophy, in other words, 
affirms the ontological priority of the inconsistent ground, the lacking presupposition, 
the vanishing mediation; while Marx’s, despite its dialectical ambiguity, stands for the 
actualisation of a positive potentiality. The end for Hegel has always-already taken 
place, because it is the insubstantial ground of any dialectical ontology. As with 
Freudian psychoanalysis, reason for Hegel operates only against the background of 
its own impossibility, with which it engages in a battle it has always-already lost. 
Thus, being able to reflect on the elementary impossibility of the human condition is 
reason’s highest task, the point where it achieves what Hegel terms “absolute 
knowing”, which is freedom. Never before had philosophy dared to reveal how 
reason reaches itself the moment it loses itself. The difficult theoretical point to grasp 
here is that the vanishing of reason’s capacity to sustain itself is also its condition of 
possibility, which continues to haunt reason as its explosive truth. Once again, it is 
precisely this theme of the speculative coincidence of opposites that we should re-
politicise today, when beholding the spectacular triumph/implosion of the capitalist 
mode of production. 
To grasp the modality of the ongoing decomposition of our social bond, let us 
briefly consider how, in order to enforce the hegemony of the value-form, capital 
continues to play a hazardous game with labour: on the one hand, it uses labour-
power as the inexhaustible dynamo for the generation of surplus-value, but on the 
other it domesticates it by positing its abstract computability and exchangeability as 
its own (capital’s) necessary presupposition. While labour for capital is fundamentally 
a countable entity, it nevertheless remains uncountable in itself, as a negative self-
relation that survives its socio-economic abstraction. It is an object of calculation and 
exchange on the surface, but also a mesmerising (unconscious) subjective force; in 
short, it is an abstract and a concrete universal. Or, in Marx’s own words from the 
Grundrisse, “labour is absolute poverty as object, on one side, and is, on the other 
side, the general possibility of wealth as subject and as activity”.37 (Although, as 
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anticipated, Marx ontologised work qua Aristotelian potentiality to flourish and 
overcome alienation, rather than as a negative self-relation). 
The potential explosiveness of the above contradiction, which remains latent 
within the economy, is what capital attempts to use in its favour by positing labour as 
its own externality (in Hegelese, as external determination). However, precisely 
because capital and labour coincide as speculatively identical manifestations of 
value, the radical heterogeneity of work as concrete universal inevitably threatens to 
unmask the negativity of capital itself, the fact that capital in its deepest configuration 
coincides with its own lack. For it is increasingly obvious that, today, labour betrays 
capital, its masterminding alter-ego in the pantomime of endless productivity. This is, 
of course, not because of labour’s antagonistic self-awareness as class, but because 
the current rate of technological automation exposes the devastating (Hegelian) 
immanent contradiction that underlies the historically ‘productively contradictory’ 
bond between capital and labour. As more and more living labour is expelled from 
production, increasingly without a chance of re-entering the exploitation game, work 
formally becomes what it always-already was, a negative, inconsistent category that, 
as such, intrinsically resists full assimilation within the modern logic of abstract 
quantification. Conversely, no longer supported by its internal presupposition, 
capitalist universality comes apart at the seams, being forced to reveal its bluff and 
the emptiness at its core.  
 
The Whole is the Hole 
While Marx revealed his debt to Hegel by describing the transition from C-M-C 
(money-form of value) to M-C-M’ (capital-form of value) as a way for money to 
externalise itself, thus escaping its internal contradiction (essentially, the fact that a 
commodity must be sold before another one can be bought), he nevertheless failed 
fully to unravel the grounding inconsistency of the capitalist link. In his materialistic 
adaptation of Hegel’s dialectic, he eventually missed the key intuition according to 
which, insofar as it is a logical whole, the self-valorisation dynamic of capitalist 
accumulation is structured around a hole, a lacking or negative cause. This hole qua 
absent cause is the central character in the capitalist whodunit, the fundamental 
ingredient in political economy’s pie. This is why Jacques Lacan’s discourse theory, 
where the social bond is shown to be articulated around its lack, can be employed 
successfully to explore the changing role fulfilled by the missing cause in the 
structural shift from C-M-C to M-C-M’.  
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In one brief scene of Mike Figgis’ Leaving Las Vegas (1995), alcoholic Ben 
(Nicolas Cage) approaches a motel called ‘The Whole Year Inn’. As he is waiting to 
book a room, he looks up smilingly at the motel neon sign as it suddenly morphs into 
‘The Hole You’re In’. This linguistic hallucination, which would have tickled Lacan, is 
anticipatory of Ben’s predicament, for he will never find a way out of his self-
destructive rut. The metaphor suggested by Ben’s alcohol-fuelled delirium can easily 
be extended beyond the filmic narrative and into our socio-historical landscape. 
Since recently, apocalyptic scenarios have found a way into our cultural and socio-
political imagination. It seems as if the ideological phantasmagoria of endless 
growth that became hegemonic in the 1980s has suddenly turned into a dark vision 
of incumbent catastrophe and annihilation. Perhaps, however, we should think the 
optimistic end-of-history (Fukuyama) slogans of the 1990s as properly Hegelian 
reminders that history has always-already ended, because its end – history’s 
reconciliation with its non-existence – is the precondition for its appearance. Instead, 
individually and collectively we continue to invest our beliefs in the obdurate 
capitalist narrative by displacing its demise onto an array of alternative placeholders 
whose role is, paradoxically, to strengthen that very fantasy. Typically, the collapse 
we fear has different faces, from ecological catastrophe to nuclear war, rise of global 
terror, neo-fascism and so on. But all of these scenarios effectively prevent us from 
thinking the elementary inconsistency of our mode of production, whose increasingly 
desperate impotence ends up buried under the fear of the calamitous consequences 
it threatens to unleash. The situation remains not only objectively depressed but also, 
most importantly for us, contradictory: while still enjoying (concretely or wishfully) the 
fruits of capitalist progress, we are also increasingly mindful that globalization is 
driving itself into a hole from which there is no exit in sight. We are becoming aware 
of how quickly and remorselessly our work society is digging its own grave; how 
capitalist utopia has become self-destructive, as the moment of its triumph overlaps 
uncannily with the moment of its defeat. 
Today, more than ever before, we should begin from the acknowledgment that 
all cultural and political debates are null and void without reference to political 
economy and its epochal naturalisation. Whether we lament the ascendancy of 
populism or the return of authoritarian ideologies, we would be mistaken in 
disconnecting the ethico-political implications of these symptoms from the regime of 
abstraction provided by their economic context. Any political or existential concern 
today needs to be corroborated by an examination of the state of our economy, 
intended not as a theory of marginal utility, which ignores production, but as a theory 
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of the social relation between capital and labour that continues to be based on the 
exploitation of labour-power in spite of its ongoing liquidation.  
While capital is by definition a restless contradiction that manifests itself at 
different levels of abstraction, the key conflict today should be located in the absolute 
failure of the relation of exploitation between capital and labour. Simply stated, this 
relation is losing its capacity to produce the elementary conditions upon which 
modern societies are built. The reason for this failure is that the contradiction at the 
heart of the capitalist mode of production is no longer working in its favour. Both 
historically and structurally, then, our conundrum appears as follows: the economy’s 
drive to generate surplus-value is both the drive to exploit the workforce and to expel 
it from the production process; while only the exploitation of labour-power leads to 
the formation of surplus-value, competition compels capital to reduce labour costs to 
a minimum. While this paradox (labour as value-substance, and labour as cost to be 
sacrificed to the altar of competition) constitutes the lifeblood of capitalism as a 
mode of production, today it backfires, turning the economy into a mode of 
permanent devastation. The reason for this change of fortune is objective, a failure 
inherent in the structural configuration of the capitalist machine: the current, 
unprecedented acceleration rate of technological automation means that more 
labour-power is being ejected from production than reabsorbed; thus, capitalism 
follows its powerful productive logic down into the (financial) nightmare of its real 
impotence. In what is only deceptively a different context, this systemic failure is 
unveiled in the 2019 miniseries Chernobyl. The simple yet enlightening insight 
provided by the series’ last episode is that the failure of the nuclear reactor that led to 
the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 was not, in the last instance, imputable to the 
plant’s engineers, despite their criminal behaviour in insisting to carry out a safety 
test without the necessary precautions being in place. Ultimately, the reactor 
exploded because of a design flaw in the control rods, an elementary system failure 
that had to do with the backwardness of the technology employed at a time of 
widespread economic recession, which first Andropov (1982-84) and then 
Gorbachev (1985-91) unsuccessfully attempted to stem. Chernobyl therefore can be 
read as a metaphor for the systemic breakdown of a mode of production which (this 
is what the series does not say) shared with the capitalist one the same reliance on 
the exploitation of the workforce qua abstract labour. While in the 1980s western 
capitalism was able to overcome its valorisation crisis through a significant salto 
mortale in the financial sector, this option was not available to Soviet ‘state 
capitalism’, which therefore collapsed. In fact, however, we are talking about the 
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same systemic failure originating in the formidable acceleration of automated 
productivity (third industrial revolution).    
As Martin Ford puts it, most jobs today are “squarely in the sights as software 
automation and predictive algorithms advance rapidly in capability”.38 This is true not 
only of the manufacturing industry, but also of other key sectors such as logistics, 
white-collar, services and retail. Furthermore, algorithms, Big Data and AI are quickly 
colonising the knowledge industry, including areas until recently considered resistant 
to intelligent technologies. All this means that we are already facing the collapse of 
the virtuous feedback loop between production, wages and consumption. In such a 
bleak context, recourse to financial prestidigitations is the only way in which collapse 
can be not so much avoided, but temporarily postponed – and, again, this 
postponement strategy was precisely what was not available to socialist economies 
in the 1980s. In short, the simulation of growth in the financial sector hides the 
economy’s best-kept secret, its real lack of growth. It would be hard to deny that, 
more than ten years after its latest devastating crisis, the world economy is still 
plagued by the same sickness that caused the global credit crunch of 2008, as well 
as the economic crises of the last 40 years or so. Global productivity growth is slowly 
but surely heading toward stagnation – currently well below 2 percent, with 
advanced economies faring much worse than smaller emerging ones.39 In this 
setting, debt-leveraged financialisation constitutes contemporary capitalism’s 
specific type of escapism: it is the (inevitable) forward-escape route for a model of 
socio-economic reproduction that has hit against its historical limit and is now 
caught within a seemingly endless downward trajectory. By continuing to borrow 
from the future (‘imaginary’ profits to come), our economy only has one (desperate) 
aim: to defer its own collapse and that of the societies it supports. The point here is 
that contemporary capitalism’s financial overdose and credit binge are not simply 
self-inflicted sicknesses. They are not just destructive revenants of a more stable, 
rational and healthy socio-economic structure. Instead, they capture the essence of 
the capitalist dialectic insofar as it is increasingly incapable of profiting from its 
inherent contradiction (labour as posited presupposition). This means that, while the 
financialisation of our economies originates in the same ontology of self-valorization 
that characterised it from its inception, it is also a symptom of its exhaustion and 
fundamental impotence. As Robert Kurz argued back in 1999:40 
 
Credit (i.e., the mass of the savings of society which are collected by the 
banking system and lent for the purpose of production or consumption in 
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exchange for interest payments) is quite a normal capitalist phenomenon, 
but its importance has grown as the capitalist expansionary development 
accelerated. Credit implies the usage of future money revenue (and, hence, 
of a future employment of workers and the future creation of substance of 
value) in order to maintain the present operation. The development of credit 
since the beginning of the 20th century, and likewise the ‘de-substantiation’ 
of money through the disconnection from the real substance of value (i.e., 
the end of the gold standard), already indicated the immanent barrier of the 
process of valorization, which comes to the surface today. 
 
Kurz’s point is that a falling rate of profit, as predicted by Marx in volume 3 of 
Capital, can exist next to an increase in the mass of profit only if “the corresponding 
future money revenues were really obtained on the basis of the real substance of 
value (including payments of interest). But this was made and is being made 
increasingly impossible by the Third Industrial Revolution”, and, today, by the Fourth.41 
The implication is that, as the route into credit and annexed ‘casino capitalism’ turns 
into an inevitability, the catastrophic effect of crisis becomes a realistic possibility as 
the gap between the creation of fictitious capital and its basis in the real substance of 
value (labour-power) widens. When ‘money that makes money work’ (finance) loses 
its connection with ‘money that makes people work’, the result can only be a drastic 
devaluation of existing capital with breakdown potential. The 2008 crisis effectively 
confirmed Kurz’s (and others before him)42 prediction that “the simulated perpetuation 
of the capitalist expansion starts to reach its limits”.  
It is for the above reason that our moment is Hegelian: the stealthy self-
movement of the capitalist dialectic falters; instead of reproducing its own rationale 
and conditions of possibility, it generates the foundational inconsistency that was 
always immanent to its reproductive logic, and that can be sublated neither by the 
optical illusions of finance nor by yet another level of abstraction (Schumpeterian 
creative destruction) in the real economy.43 It seems to me that, in its deepest 
configuration, this inconsistency corresponds to work as concrete universal – work 
as the persistence of a contradiction that demands a different resolution outside the 
current parameters of political economy. This also means that all radical critiques of 
work, all the libertarian no-work utopias, miss the key Hegelian point, developed in 
the “Doctrine of Essence” (Science of Logic), about the necessity for reflective 
determination to redouble into determining reflection: the inherent negativity of 
reflection (thought’s self-relating contradictoriness) has no other way of subsisting 
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than by engaging in a self-alienating correlation that, by sparing thought its abyssal 
inconsistency, might afford it a degree of (fragile, yet necessary) determinacy. Work 
needs to know what it is working for – like all forms of life, it can only operate within 
an intrinsically alienating dialectical relation. Work, in other words, by definition needs 
a politics to authorise it, to organise its concrete impossibility into an (at least 
minimally) abstract possibility.  
Lacan allows us to grasp the above point directly: work is always the work of 
the unconscious (savoir-faire), the surplus-jouissance that sticks to whatever we do 
or think; which is why it is consubstantial with human life and it needs to be (at least 
minimally) domesticated. When we say that we are now reaching a Hegelian 
moment, then, we mean that the centuries-old capitalist domestication of work into 
labour-power is not working any longer. While frightening, this event is also 
potentially liberating, since it opens up the meaning of work to its redefinition via a 
radically different relation to what ‘will have conditioned it’ – since the dialectic 
follows a logic of retroactive signification. How? Let us take, again, the example of 
the capitalist dialectic: while, as Marx clearly understood,44 capital validates its own 
structure après coup, after the fact, since commodity-producing labour turns into 
value only after commodities are sold, by the same dialectical token this mechanism 
functions precisely because capital has always-already subsumed work as wage 
labour, thus positing its own labour presupposition as self-othering value. Market 
exchange, in other words, is predicated upon a retroactive signification of 
production: the act of exchange takes place against the abstracting relation to work 
as labour-power. In more general terms, the implication is that for something to 
obtain social effectivity, a retroactive logic needs to be in place through which the 
presuppositions to one’s activity ‘will have been validated’. Lacan’s theory of 
subjective identification through language entails this very short-circuiting of future 
and past: all subjectivities, in their intrinsic instability, form themselves on the basis of 
linguistic resignification, since they consolidate (or transform) their content by 
constantly writing (or reconfiguring) their own conditions of possibility, that is to say 
the signifiers that ‘will have signified them’. Thus, as Lacan put it, we are not what we 
were, or have been, but what we will have been.45 
 
The Difficulty of Letting Go 
As anticipated, the main challenge we are facing today would seem to have to 
do with our collective inability to translate the objectively self-destructive character of 
our socio-ontological condition into a subjective desire to move beyond it. This 
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passage can only be dialectical. As such, it will not happen seamlessly, as some 
commentators – armed with a dubious dose of potentially dangerous optimism – 
have been arguing since the debate on labour-shedding automation has gone viral. 
Rather, to grasp the stakes of social transformation today we should keep firmly in 
mind Freud’s well-known Latin quotation from Virgil’s Aeneid: “Flectere si nequeo 
superos, Acheronta movebo”. Freud was very fond of this line and used it as the 
motto for his seminal work The Interpretation of Dreams. It means, roughly, that “If I 
cannot bend the heavenly powers, I will have to move the powers of hell”. Read as a 
psychoanalytic metaphor, it points to the difficult retroactive recalibration of our 
unconscious attachments (modes of enjoyment) as the necessary step toward the 
overcoming of our social impasse.  
In his book The Brave New World of Work, sociologist Ulrich Beck described 
this challenge in a series of existential questions which reflect our self-defining 
attachment to valorised work:  
 
Along which coordinates can people’s lives be structured if there is no 
longer the discipline of a paid job? Is its loss not the root of all evil: drug 
addiction, crime, social disintegration? How can people’s basic existence 
and social status be assured if these no longer rest upon performance at 
work? Which ideas of justice, or even of social inequality, can serve as the 
measure of people’s lives, if society no longer thinks of itself as ‘hard-
working’ or ‘industrious’? What does the state mean if one of its most 
important sources of tax revenue – paid employment – dries up? How is 
democracy possible if it is not based upon participation in paid 
employment? How will people’s social identity be determined, if they no 
longer have to tell themselves and others that ‘what they do in life’ is one of 
the standard occupations? What would be the meaning of governance, 
order, freedom – or even of society itself? Visions that work will 
progressively disappear as the social norm rebound off the faith that most 
people still have in job miracles and in themselves as citizens of the work 
society. Having lost their faith in God, they believe instead in the godlike 
powers of work to provide everything sacred to them: prosperity, social 
position, personality, meaning in life, democracy, political cohesion. Just 
name any value of modernity, and I will show that it assumes the very thing 
about which it is silent: participation in paid work.46 
         
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Emancipation after Hegel 
 
 
 
 
102 
While Beck – the theorist of the risk society – as a rule abstains from 
confronting the macroeconomic presuppositions of the work society, which 
ultimately makes his analysis superficial, we should nevertheless heed the warnings 
contained in the above passage: in capitalist modernity wage labour informs the 
totality of our existence, including its unconscious mode of enjoyment. Here we 
should go all the way: by shaping the totality of our experience, labour represents the 
anthropomorphic side of capital, its self-othering qua automatic subject; which also 
means, of course, that the more capital emancipates from labour (expelling it from 
production), the more its narrative loses its footing, thus inexorably heading for 
implosion. 
Our libidinal attachment to the work society is so ingrained and pervasive that 
it continues to define us even after the traditional notion of productivity, based on the 
exploitation of human labour, has largely been replaced by the alchemic rituals of 
financialization, which has now become ubiquitous and quasi-sovereign. This point 
can be quickly summarized via another brief filmic reference, Woody Allen’s Blue 
Jasmine (2013), which delivers a very simple yet effective punch: a precise 
description of the psychic imbalance affecting the global post-2008 subject. Jasmine 
marries a rich broker, ends up penniless after he is incarcerated for corruption, but – 
and here is Allen’s touch of genius – she still flies first class. That is to say, she 
believes (literally, for she suffers from an increasingly damaging form of delusion) 
that, despite her sudden fall from grace, she continues to belong to the glitzy Park 
Avenue society of the 1%. While she knows that her economic circumstances have 
drastically worsened, she refuses to accept her new situation, taking refuge instead 
in increasingly crippling delusional fantasies, as if her subjectivity had been torn 
asunder from her social context. 
It would be useful to concede that, within the ongoing crisis of the form of life 
specific to our epoch, we are all like Jasmine – we share her psychology. Despite its 
current, increasingly manifest deterioration, the Crystal Palace of the Wertform 
continues to identify us by providing the illusory sense of domesticity and 
everydayness we crave, thus defusing any real, class-related antagonism of the 
Marxian ilk. Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crystal Palace (together with Walter Benjamin’s 
Parisian Arcades) is the architectural metaphor that, as Peter Sloterdijk argues, 
conveys more convincingly the hermeneutics of the spell we call capitalist 
alienation,47 even more doggedly so at the time of its historical exhaustion. Such 
metaphor “invokes the idea of an enclosure so spacious that one might never have 
to leave it”.48 Or, to use a well-known metaphor from popular culture, a Hotel 
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California where “we are all just prisoners of our own device”, and, more pointedly, 
where “you can check out at any time, but you can never leave”.49 Capitalist captivity, 
which of courses reaches beyond the relations of production, owes its ideological 
power not merely to appearing necessary, but to constantly evoking the openness of 
freedom: “It implies the project of placing the entire working life, wish life and 
expressive life of the people it affect[s] within the immanence of spending power.”50  
Although its artificial ether is growing toxic and unbreathable, the great Palace 
of consumer capitalism continues to tell us who we are by shaping the flows of our 
desires, in a colossal effort to immunize us from its systemic contradictions. This way, 
it functions for us as what philosophers call ‘substance’, a concept Lacan captured 
with the deceptively simple term big Other (grand Autre): the invisible 
presuppositions that confer a veneer of meaningfulness and sanity upon a human 
life that, in itself, is from start to end suspended over its own void. After the wake-up 
call of the 2008 credit crunch, we have opted to retreat once again in the big Other of 
the capitalist relation, a globalized fiction that stages the economy and its 
immunizing powers as our natural and indestructible habitat. But how long will our 
epochal delusion last? How long, in the face of the decomposition of our social 
bond, will we be able to endure this stale ceremony? 
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